Files\\2011 Case Study\\CS1\_Primary Sources\_Policy\_Strategies\\2011 International Strategy for Cyberspace - § 1 reference coded [ 0.06% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.06% Coverage

will carefully weigh the costs and risks of action against the costs of inaction

Files\\2011 Case Study\\CS1\_Primary Sources\_Policy\_Strategies\\2011 National Military Strategy - § 2 references coded [ 0.16% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.10% Coverage

they make cost/benefit calculations and are dependent on states and other stakeholders we are capable of influencing.

Reference 2 - 0.05% Coverage

Denying an aggressor the benefits of achieving its objectives

Files\\2015 Case Study\\CS2\_Primary Sources\_Policy\_Strategies\\2015 White House Report on Cyber Deterrence Policy - § 4 references coded [ 0.72% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.20% Coverage

In taking this approach, the Administration will continually refine current capabilities and develop new ones that will raise the costs and reduce the benefits of conducting malicious cyber activity against the United States and its interests.

Reference 2 - 0.17% Coverage

Influence is achieved by credibly demonstrating the ability and willingness to deny benefits or impose costs to convince the adversary that restraint will result in better outcomes than will confrontation.

Reference 3 - 0.12% Coverage

Such efforts to change an adversary’s risk-benefit calculus have the potential to limit perceived options and can be pursued independent of attribution.

Reference 4 - 0.23% Coverage

The Administration will continue to promote the adoption of the Framework as a key means of improving U.S. cyber defenses and, by extension, decreasing adversaries’ perceptions of the benefits to be gained from engaging in malicious cyber activities against U.S. computers and networks.

Files\\2018 Case Study\\CS3\_Primary Sources\_Policy\_Strategies\\2017 National Security Strategy - § 1 reference coded [ 0.05% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.05% Coverage

A stronger and more resilient critical infrastructure will strengthen deterrence by creating doubt in our adversaries that they can achieve their objectives.