Files\\2011 Case Study\\CS1\_Primary Sources\_Policy\_Strategies\\2011 International Strategy for Cyberspace - § 2 references coded [ 0.16% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.11% Coverage

Deterrence The United States will ensure that the risks associated with attacking or exploiting our networks vastly outweigh the potential benefits~

Reference 2 - 0.06% Coverage

will carefully weigh the costs and risks of action against the costs of inaction

Files\\2011 Case Study\\CS1\_Primary Sources\_Policy\_Strategies\\2011 National Military Strategy - § 2 references coded [ 0.16% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.10% Coverage

they make cost/benefit calculations and are dependent on states and other stakeholders we are capable of influencing.

Reference 2 - 0.05% Coverage

Denying an aggressor the benefits of achieving its objectives

Files\\2015 Case Study\\CS2\_Primary Sources\_Policy\_Strategies\\2015 White House Report on Cyber Deterrence Policy - § 4 references coded [ 0.72% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.20% Coverage

In taking this approach, the Administration will continually refine current capabilities and develop new ones that will raise the costs and reduce the benefits of conducting malicious cyber activity against the United States and its interests.

Reference 2 - 0.17% Coverage

Influence is achieved by credibly demonstrating the ability and willingness to deny benefits or impose costs to convince the adversary that restraint will result in better outcomes than will confrontation.

Reference 3 - 0.12% Coverage

Such efforts to change an adversary’s risk-benefit calculus have the potential to limit perceived options and can be pursued independent of attribution.

Reference 4 - 0.23% Coverage

The Administration will continue to promote the adoption of the Framework as a key means of improving U.S. cyber defenses and, by extension, decreasing adversaries’ perceptions of the benefits to be gained from engaging in malicious cyber activities against U.S. computers and networks.

Files\\2018 Case Study\\CS3\_Primary Sources\_Policy\_Strategies\\2017 National Security Strategy - § 1 reference coded [ 0.05% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.05% Coverage

A stronger and more resilient critical infrastructure will strengthen deterrence by creating doubt in our adversaries that they can achieve their objectives.

Files\\2023 Case Study\\CS4\_Primary Sources\_Policy\_Strategies\\2022 National Defense Strategy - § 5 references coded [ 0.32% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.05% Coverage

Tailored to specific circumstances, it applies a coordinated, multifaceted approach to reducing competitors’ perceptions of the net benefits of aggression relative to restraint.

Reference 2 - 0.04% Coverage

Deterrence is strengthened by actions that reduce a competitor’s perception of the benefits of aggression relative to restraint.

Reference 3 - 0.10% Coverage

Effective deterrence requires the Department to consider how competitors perceive U.S., Ally, and partner stakes, commitment, and combat credibility; their perception of their own ability to control escalation risks; and their view of how the status quo will evolve – in part as a result of U.S., Ally, and partner actions – if they do not use force.

Reference 4 - 0.07% Coverage

Deterrence by Direct and Collective Cost Imposition. Denial and resilience strategies are necessary but not always sufficient. Effective deterrence may also hinge on our ability to impose costs in excess to the perceived benefits of aggression.

Reference 5 - 0.06% Coverage

The Department will take steps to raise potential attackers’ direct and indirect costs while reducing their expected benefits for aggressive action against the homeland, particularly by increasing resilience.

Files\\2023 Case Study\\CS4\_Primary Sources\_Policy\_Strategies\\2022 National Military Strategy - § 2 references coded [ 1.45% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.55% Coverage

Integrated Deterrence influences adversary decision calculus by affecting perception of costs, benefits, and consequences of restraint.

Reference 2 - 0.90% Coverage

Through the NMS’ theory of success, the Joint Force contributes to Integrated Deterrence to reduce an adversary’s perceived benefit and increase the adversary’s perceived cost of aggression, incentivizing restraint as a result.

Files\\2023 Case Study\\CS4\_Primary Sources\_Policy\_Strategies\\2022 National Security Strategy - § 1 reference coded [ 0.07% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.07% Coverage

Our National Defense Strategy relies on integrated deterrence: the seamless combination of capabilities to convince potential adversaries that the costs of their hostile activities outweigh their benefits.1

Files\\2023 Case Study\\CS4\_Primary Sources\_Policy\_Strategies\\2023 National Cybersecurity Strategy - § 1 reference coded [ 0.12% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.12% Coverage

Disruption campaigns must become so sustained and targeted that criminal cyber activity is rendered unprofitable and foreign government actors engaging in malicious cyber activity no longer see it as an effective means of achieving their goals.

**Annotations**

1 Definition of Integrated Deterrence